

Hunt cycle - percolator- bounty3-wrapper- r2.

AUDITOR	Kirill Sakharuk · kirill@jelleo.com
CUSTOMER	percolator-bounty3-wrapper-r2
WINDOW	cycle 20260507-004313-04b854e
CYCLE	20260507-004313-04b854e
ENGINE SHA	04b854e
WRAPPER SHA	04b854e571
GENERATED	2026-05-08T22:33:19+00:00

0 CRITICAL	0 HIGH	0 MEDIUM	0 LOW	0 INFO
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CONFIRMED · DISCLOSED · FIXED · VERIFIED

3 REJECTED (FALSE POSITIVE)

SIGNED · ED25519

MCowBQYDK2VwAyEAvCFSLBecPuNClci48PwjHu
eLHlBX9uYZo4wELbQ7b+k=

```
verify with audit-pipeline sign verify  
<file> <file>.sig --pubkey  
jelleo.ed25519.pub  
public key at  
https://jelleo.com/keys/jelleo.ed25519.pub
```

PLATFORM · V0.1

JELLEO · The underwriting layer for Solana
DeFi.

Methodology jelleo.com/methodology.html

Disclosure jelleo.com/security.html


Source github.com/Copenhagen0x/audit-pipeline-cli

Apache-2.0 · contact security@jelleo.com

percolator-bounty3-wrapper-r2 · hunt cycle

20260507-004313-04b854e · started 2026-05-07T00:43:13+00:00 · engine 04b854e · wrapper 04b854e571

01 — CYCLE SUMMARY



■ Critical 1 ■ High 2 ■ Medium 0 ■ Low 0 ■ Info 0

02 — FINDINGS

SEVERITY	HYPOTHESIS	TITLE	VERDICT	STATUS	POC
CRITICAL	B62-funding-k-walk-no-oracle-move	Funding-rate K-walk variant w/o oracle move (per disclosed issue #62). The deployed bounty-2 mainnet binary was exposed	UNKNOWN / UNKNOWN	REJECTED	—
HIGH	B70-tradenocpi-oversized-trade-panic	TradeNoCpi/TradeCpi production panic from oversized trade (per disclosed issue #70). On origin/main at fb1116c1839b6, Tr	UNKNOWN / UNKNOWN	REJECTED	—
HIGH	B77-tradecpi-is-signer-forward	TradeCpi is_signer flag forwarding (per disclosed issue #77). The TradeCpi handler's variadic tail (accounts[8..]) is pa	UNKNOWN / UNKNOWN	REJECTED	—

A — SEVERITY RUBRIC

TIER	DEFINITION
CRITICAL	Direct loss of user funds or full protocol takeover with no meaningful preconditions. Reachable from a permissionless instruction by any signer. Must be patched immediately.
HIGH	Significant loss of user funds or protocol invariant violation under realistic preconditions (specific market state, signer with limited but obtainable role). Patch should ship in next release.

TIER	DEFINITION
MEDIUM	Hardening issue, partial loss possible, or invariant violation requiring privileged signer or improbable state. Worth fixing in normal cadence.
LOW	Minor issue with no plausible path to fund loss. Code-quality or defense-in-depth concern.
INFO	Informational. No security impact. Documentation or style suggestion.

— B — METHODOLOGY

This cycle was produced by Jelleo's continuous, hypothesis-driven Solana audit loop. Every finding originates as a falsifiable invariant claim from a per-protocol hypothesis library, dispatched to multi-agent recon (Layer 1), promoted on contested verdicts via adversarial debate (Layer 1.5), and confirmed empirically via a **cargo test** proof-of-concept (Layer 2) before transitioning to **confirmed**. Confirmed findings auto-fire structural sibling derivation and cross-protocol propagation hooks, then move through a restricted lifecycle (**new** → **triaged** → **confirmed** → **disclosed** → **fixed** → **verified**). Every cycle is signed Ed25519 against the platform key — see the cover-page receipt.

Full spec: [docs/methodology/](#) (eleven sections, §01–§10) · Live reference: jelleo.com/methodology.html · Inaugural disclosure: [aeyakovenko/percolator-prog#39](#) (F7, 2026-04)